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Kelly: Constitutional Law - Water Law - Constitutionality of Water Expor
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WATER LAW- Constitutionality of Water Export
Bans and Limitations on Interstate Water Allocation. Sporhase v.
- U.S. -,
102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,

In 1972, Joy Sporhase purchased a block of farmland that
straddled the gravel road marking the border between Chase
County, Nebraska and Phillips County, Colorado. A water
well, drilled by previous owners of the land, was located on the
Nebraska tract a few feet from the state line. The well produced ground water that was pumped through a center pivot
system, irrigating crops on both the Nebraska and Colorado
tracts. A former owner had indicated on his well registration
form that he intended to irrigate his land on both sides of the
state line, but neither he nor Sporhase applied for a permit to
transport water from the Nebraska well for use in Colorado as
required by Nebraska statute.1 Section 46-613.01 of the
Nebraska Revised Statutes provided:
Any person.., intending to withdraw ground water
from any well or pit located in the State of Nebraska
and transport it for use in an adjoining state shall apply
to the Department of Water Resources for a permit to
do so. If the Director of Water Resources finds that the
withdrawal of ground water requested is reasonable, is
not contrary to the conservation and use of ground
water, and is not otherwise detrimental to the public
welfare, he shall grant the permit if the state in which
the water is to be used grants reciprocal rights to
from that state
withdraw and transport ground water
2
for use in the State of Nebraska.
In 1977 the State of Nebraska obtained an injunction prohibiting Sporhase from transporting Nebraska ground water
into Colorado without a permit. 3 On appeal the Nebraska
Supreme Court upheld the injunction, rejecting the defense
that the suspect statute imposed an impermissible burden on
Copyright@ 1983 by the University of Wyoming
U.S.
-,
102 S. Ct. 3456, 3458 (1982).
1. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,
See also Russakoff, Farmer,'Country Hick' Lawyer Upset Legal System, The Denver
Post, Sept. 19, 1982, sec. F (Region), at 1, col. 1.
2. NEB. REV. STAT. S 46-613.01 (Reissue 1978).
3. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S. Ct. at 3458 (1982). Due to the last requirement of
S 46-613.01, Sporhase would not have been granted a permit even had he applied for one.
Since Colorado absolutely forbade the exportation of its ground water, reciprocity would
have been impossible. Colorado law provided, "[1it is unlawful for any person to divert,
carry, or transport ... any of the ground waters of this state.., into any other state for
use therein." COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-90-136 (1973).
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interstate commerce. 4 The Nebraska court held that the
statute did not violate the commerce clause 5 since Nebraska
ground water was not "a market item freely transferable for
value among6 private parties, and therefore not an article of
commerce."

On direct appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Nebraska decision. In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas the Court abandoned any distinction between ground
water and other natural resources, finding water to be an article of commerce subject to traditional burden-on-commerce
analysis as well as to affirmative congressional regulation.
Speaking through Justice Stevens, the Court further held that
the reciprocity requirement did not significantly advance
Nebraska's legitimate conservation and preservation concerns
and that in any event the requirement was not narrowly
tailored toward achieving those ends. 8 Finally, the Court
declined to accept the suggestion that Congress had authorized the states to impose otherwise impermissible burdens on interstate commerce in ground water. Neither the failure of Congress to establish uniform federal water laws, nor the willingness of Congress to allow the states to settle their own
water disputes was enough to persuade the Justices that Congress had consented to the "unilateral imposition of
unreasonable burdens on commerce." 9 This note will focus on
the Court's commerce clause analysis and the effect of that
analysis in limiting the states' authority to regulate water control on the local level, particularly in the context of interstate
allocation.
I. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF WATER EXPORT
PROHIBITIONS BEFORE Sporhase

The framework of judicial commerce clause analysis is well
established. By virtue of the commerce clause, Congress has
the unquestioned constitutional power to regulate not only
4. State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614, 616 (1981).
5. "Congress shall have power.., to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States..." U.S. CONST. art. 1, S 8,cl.3.
6. 305 N.W.2d at 616.
7. 102 S.Ct. at 3463.
8. Id. at 3465.
9. Id. at 3466.
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actual articles of interstate commerce, but also the overall
stream of commerce.10 In the absence of conflicting or preemptive congressional legislation, however, the states are
recognized to possess a limited degree of power to govern matters of significant local concern which nevertheless affect or
regulate interstate commerce.11
Historically, the federal government has acknowledged
the vastly different geographic, climatic and economic regions
of the nation and has left the control and regulation of water
resources to the states. 12 Congress has consistently deferred
to state water law, 13 and the Supreme Court has repeatedly attested to the "superior competence" of the individual states in
conserving and preserving scarce water resources. 14 Thus,
water users have, by and large, come to rely on state water
laws as a means of controlling the use and appropriation of
that resource. 1 It is this traditional confidence in the applicability of individual state law which resulted in a split of
authority prior to Sporhase.
Sporhase cleared the air with respect to earlier disparate
decisions. In Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, the
Supreme Court upheld a New Jersey statute that prohibited
the transfer of surface waters for use in another state. 16 The
Court noted that the state's interest in conserving its water
was "obvious" and held the state's exercise of its police power
to be a legitimate weapon in securing that interest.' Briefly
disposing of any commerce clause attack upon the statute, the
Court found the state to have an ownership interest in its
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766-70 (1945).
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978).
Id.
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3463 (1982). See also California Oregon Power Co. v.
Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 163 (1935).

15. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 638
(1957). In theory water law in the and West might logically have been federal. There are
at least two constitutional bases on which the United States could assert complete control
and regulation of water. First is the federal ownership of public lands as a basis for
riparian water rights. Throughout its history the United States has been the predominant
landowner in the West. Second, under its commerce power the federal government has
the power to secure the uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams within the
jurisdiction of the United States. C. Corker, Constitutional Restraints on Protecting
State Interests in Water Rights 1-8-1-9 (June 8, 1982) (unpublished paper available from
Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law).
16. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
17. Id. at 356.
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water resources and therefore the ability to qualify any ownership rights that it chose to recognize. 18 The state was in possession of a commodity and thus able to preclude that commodity
from entering into the stream of interstate commerce. 19
The only case presenting a realistic alternative to Hudson
County questioned a Texas statute which sought to prohibit
the exportation of Texas ground water into Oklahoma without
legislative approval.2 ° In City of Altus v. Carr, the Supreme
Court, per curiam and without opinion, affirmed the decision
of a federal district court striking down the Texas statute as
imposing an unreasonable burden upon interstate commerce. 1
In razing the Texas statute, the district court assumed a
somewhat different posture regarding the state's attempted
water export ban from that assumed by the Supreme Court in
its earlier Hudson County decision. The district court rejected
Texas' contention that ground water was not an article of commerce, noting that Texas law recognized withdrawn ground
water as an item of personal property subject to ordinary commercial regulation. 22 The City of Altus court further held that
public interest in the preservation of scarce water resources,
while not insignificant, was insufficient to justify such a
deliberate burden upon interstate commerce.28
An inherent problem surfaced in attempting to reconcile
the holding of Hudson County with that of City ofAltus. While
the district court distinguished the two cases on the basis of
Texas' characterization of withdrawn water as an article of
personal property, subject to sale and commerce, the Supreme
Court's summary affirmation of City of Altus gave no indication whether the Court adopted this distinction. The question
remained whether or not the City ofAltus affirmation was in24
deed a sub silentio overruling of the Hudson County decision.
18. Id. at 357. Justice Holmes, author of the Hudson County opinion, primarily addressed the
"1 olice powers" aspects of the case.

19. 1d
20. The Texas statute owed its existence largely to the fact that the city of Altus, Oklahoma,

was out of water. The city went to nearby Texas for a solution, relying on a Texas at-

21.
22.
23.
24.

torney general opinion which stated no reason under Texas law to indicate that this alternative water supply was not available to Altus. The Texas legislature temporarily
thwarted this plan with a statute effectively prohibiting the withdrawal of underground
water in Texas for transport outside the state. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS S 132 (R.
Clark ed. 1967).
255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), affd per curiam, 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
Id., 255 F. Supp. at 840.
Id. at 838-40.
Comment, "It's Our Water!"- Can Wyoming ConstitutionallyProhibitthe Exportation
of State Waters?, 10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 119, 132-35 (1975).
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II. THE Sporhase DECISION

A. Water as an Article of Commerce
In Sporhase the Supreme Court held ground water to be an
article of commerce and therefore subject to congressional
regulation.2 5 While the Nebraska Supreme Court cited Hudson
County as controlling precedent, 6 in reversing the Nebraska
decision the United States Supreme Court in Sporhase found
its earlier affirmation of City of Altus to be fundamentally inconsistent with Hudson County.27 The Sporhase Court noted,
however, that in summarily affirming the decision in City of
Altus it did not subscribe to the district court's reasoning.
an agreement with the
Rather, its affirmation indicated only
28
court.
lower
the
by
reached
result
The Supreme Court acknowledged that Texas law differs
significantly from Nebraska as to the rights of a surface owner
to underlying ground water. 29 Nevertheless, it felt Nebraska's
public ownership theory to be "but a fiction expressive in legal
shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have
power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource." 30 The Sporhase Court further found that
ground water was fundamentally indistinguishable from other
natural resources. 31 The fact that Nebraska law granted the
surface owner a lesser ownership interest in ground water
than he might enjoy with respect to other captured resources
ground water from tradicould not serve to absolutely remove
32
scrutiny.
clause
tional commerce
Moreover, the Sporhase Court found the states' legitimate
interests in preserving valuable water to have an interstate
dimension.33 This characteristic was most clearly evidenced by
25. 102 S.Ct. at 3463.

26. 305 N.W.2d at 618.
27. 102 S.Ct. at 3461.
28. Id.
29. Id. Texas law maintains that the owner of the land surface owns all the water he can
pump from beneath his land. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576

S..2d 21, 26 (Tex. 1978). Nebraska ground water law is a version of the "reasonable
use" doctrine, providing essentially for public ownership of ground water subject to the
narrowly circumscribed right of reasonable use only on the overlying land. Nebraska v.
Sporhase, 305 N.W.2d at 618 (1981).
30. 102 S.Ct. at 3461 (1982) (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334 (1979) and
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948)).
31. 102 S.Ct. at 3462.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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the role of ground water in the economic cycle. Noting that the
bulk of water supplies were employed in the generation of
worldwide agricultural markets, the Court proffered these
markets as the "archtypical example of commerce" for which
federal regulation was authorized.3 4 Additionally, the Court
found a significant federal interest to exist by virtue of the
multistate character of the Ogallala aquifer, which lay beneath
Sporhase's tract of farmland and extended throughout por35
tions of several other Western states.
That the Supreme Court held ground water to be an article
of commerce is not surprising. The Nebraska Supreme Court's
holding, on the other hand, was fundamentally untenable.
Although the Nebraska court may have been justified in
assuming that City of Altus did not overrule the seventy year
old Hudson County decision, 36 a closer look reveals that any
reliance on Hudson County was in error.
Hudson County had held Geer v. Connecticut3 7 to be con-

trolling on the commerce clause issue.38 Geer, which upheld a
prohibition against the interstate transportation of captured
game birds, was in turn predicated on the theory of public
ownership of wild animals. The ill-considered holding of Geer,
however, was expressly overruled in Hughes v. Oklahoma.39
Borrowing the analysis of the earlier Geer dissent, the Hughes
Court dispelled Oklahoma's assertion of state ownership of
free-swimming minnows:
A State does not stand in the same position as the
owner of a private game reserve and it is pure fantasy
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 3462-63.
Id. at 3463.
305 N.W.2d at 618.
161 U.S. 519 (1896).
209 U.S. at 356.
441 U.S. 322,329 (1979). The Geer decision was something of an anomaly almost from the
start. Its erosion began only 15 years later when the Court handed down West v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). West held that natural gas, when reduced to possession, was a commodity belonging to the owner of the overlying land and as such was a
proper subject of interstate commerce. The decision condemned the obvious protectionist
motive of an Oklahoma statute which sought to prohibit the interstate transportation of
natural gas. In now classic language the Court said:
If the States have such power a singular situation might result. Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber, the mining States their
minerals. And why may not the products of the fields be brought within the
principle? Thus enlarged, or without that enlargement, its influence in interstate commerce need not be pointed out. To what consequences does such
power tend? If one State has it, all States have it; embargo may be retaliated by
embargo, and commerce will be halted at state lines.
221 U.S. at 255.
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to talk of "owning" wild fish, birds, or animals. Neither
the States nor the Federal Government, any more than
a hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to these
creatures40 until they are reduced to possession by skillful
capture.
Thus it is clear with respect to the Sporhase saga that the
philosophical and analytical underpinnings of the Hudson
County decision had been previously dismantled. Disregarding
any perceived inconsistencies between City of Altus and Hudson County, the latter was invalid precedent as it held the
discredited premise of Geer controlling on the public ownership and commerce clause issues. Therefore, as noted above,
the Nebraska court's confidence in Hudson County was
misplaced.
Having found ground water to be an article of commerce
and therefore controlled by traditional discrimination and
burden-on-commerce analysis, 4 the Supreme Court further
held that the affirmative power of Congress to implement its
own policies concerning ground water legislation could not be
circumvented by the nuances of state water law. 42 While the
Court felt state claims to public ownership significant and, in
fact, appeared quite willing to allow the states to indulge in
these fantasies of legal fiction, it clearly found that state law
could not exempt ground water from congressional power to
deal with overdraft problems on a national scale: "If Congress
chooses to legislate in this area under its commerce power, its
regulation need not be more limited in Nebraska than in Texas
and States with similar

. .

. [water] laws. '

43

40. 441 U.S. at 334 (quoting Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 539-40 (1896) (Field, J.,
dissenting)).

41. The Court apparently felt that the Sporhase dispute provided an appropriate forum to address the serious nature of public ownership claims to ground water. Clearly it is not
necessary for a particular commodity to be recognized as an actual article of commerce in
itself to trigger a commerce clause analysis. It is enough that the commodity relate even
tenuously to an activity which has an economic effect on interstate commerce. Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942). The Sporhase Court's recognition of ground water as
an essential element in the creation of interstate agricultural markets certainly indicates
that the characterization of.ground water as an article of commerce was not essential to
the ultimate result. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3467 (1982) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
42. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3463 (1982).
43. Id.
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B. The Extension of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. to Ground
Water
In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 44 the Supreme Court outlined the principles of commerce clause analysis employed in
Sporhase, unanimously holding:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on
the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether
it could be promoted with a lesser impact on interstate
activities .45

The Court later extended the Pike test to provide commerce clause protection to all activities of interstate commerce, including items not previously considered to be
legitimate articles of trade. 4 6 In Hughes v. Oklahoma the Court
applied the Pike test to state regulation of natural resources in
which the state asserted public ownership. 47 Finally, the

Sporhase Court employed Pike to control interstate trade in
ground water, rejecting the defense that ground water was
distinguishable from other natural resources. 48
The Pike rule outlines a number of primary factors inherent in the Court's modern commerce clause analysis. The
first and most critical factor considers whether a state law, on
its face or in its effect, regulates "evenhandedly." The evolu-

tion of Pike dictates that when a state law operates to slam the
door on the free movement of commerce across state boundaries there is a virtual presumption of per se invalidity. 49
44. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
45. Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
46. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978) (invalidating a New Jersey law prohibiting the importation of solid or liquid waste).
47. 441 U.S. at 336-38.
48. 102 S.Ct. at 3463-65.
49. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624 (1978).
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Sporhase held the reciprocity provision of the Nebraska
statute unable to pass constitutional muster as it failed to
regulate in a non-discriminatory manner.50 Because the State
of Colorado absolutely prohibited the exportation of its ground
water, 51 the Sporhase Court easily determined that the
Nebraska reciprocity requirement operated as an out-and-out
barrier to commerce between the two states.5 2 On balance,
Nebraska's reciprocity statute was discriminatory, and in any
event not narrowly tailored to the state's conservation and
preservation rationale. The provision was therefore unable to
survive the "strictest scrutiny" reserved for facially
discriminatory legislation.5 3
Looking beyond the discriminatory nature of the reciprocity requirement, the Court addressed the remaining conditions
in the Nebraska statute for the withdrawal of water for interstate transfer. Those conditions were that the withdrawal
of ground water requested be (1) reasonable, (2) not contrary
to the conservation and use of ground water, and (3) not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare. Because the burden-oncommerce analysis involves a lesser degree of scrutiny than
the discrimination-against-commerce analysis, the Sporhase
Court, in convincing dicta, found that the additional conditions
did not necessarily place an undue burdenupon interstate commerce.5 4 The Court again applied the Pike test in assessing the
legitimacy of the local public interest which the Nebraska
legislation was designed to advance. This second aspect of Pike
applies only when no overt discrimination is uncovered, thus
shifting the emphasis from discrimination to burden. Under
Pike a state-imposed burden on commerce may be tolerated
when the level of local interests clearly outweigh any inciden55
tal effects on interstate commerce.
50. 102 S.Ct. at 3465.
51. CoLo. REV. STAT. S 37-90-136 (1973) It is uncertain whether or not Sporhase would have
been granted a Nebraska ermit for water use within the state even had he applied for
one since his tract was =ocated within a so-called "critical township." Sporhase v.
Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3463-64 (1982).
52. 102 S.Ct. at 3465. The Court also noted that a reciprocity requirement could not be
justified as a response to another state's unreasonable burden upon commerce. Id. at
3465 n.18. This typifies the Court's traditional hostility toward unilaterally imposed
reciprocity provisions. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 375
(1976).
53. 102 S.Ct. at 3465.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 3463. Accord Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1983

9

562

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 18 [1983], Iss. 2, Art. 5
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVIII

Though couched primarily in terms of a burden analysis,
the Sporhase Court clearly and correctly found the Nebraska
reciprocity clause to be an insurmountable barrier to interstate
commerce and therefore discriminatory. However, in noting
the implications of the "negative commerce clause," the Court
recognized that the states may, in the absence of preemptive
congressional legislation, impose certain burdens on interstate
commerce. The Court indicated that in some rather peculiar
cases a burden upon interstate commerce may, in fact, be
necessary for a state regulatory scheme to meet the general
"evenhandedness" requirement of Pike.56 In Sporhase, for example, Nebraska law served to strictly limit the intrastate
transfer of ground water. 57 It was, therefore, essential that
the State of Nebraska also impose withdrawal and use restriction on interstate transfer. Any exemption for interstate
transfer would be inconsistent with the mandated objective of
evenhandedness in regulation.5 8
Notwithstanding the discriminatory nature of the
Nebraska statute, the Sporhase Court found the state's interest in the conservation of its scarce water resources to be
"unquestionably legitimate and highly important." 59 It is in
this regard that Sporhase, although circumscribing the power
of the states to regulate ground water, found an avenue by
which to accommodate state interests. The Pike formulation
allows for an evaluation of the relative weight of various state
interests and objectives when balancing those interests
against any burden imposed on interstate commerce.
In applying a balancing test to the non-discriminatory provisions of the Nebraska statute, the Court noted its continued
reluctance to interfere with legitimate state measures undertaken to provide for the health and safety of local citizens. 60
The Court has historically recognized a distinction between the
power of states to protect health and safety concerns and the
states' lack of power to promote economic protectionism. 6 1
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

102 S.Ct. at 3464.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3463.
Id. at 3464.
H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (state may not use its power to protect health and safety as a basis for suppressing interstate competition in dairy products).
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Interestingly, Sporhase characterized the state regulation of
water supplies as relating most directly to the health of local
citizens rather than to their economic welfare. Having
previously noted the pervasive commercial nature of ground
water in an agricultural context, this second characterization
by the Court would apparently allow the states meaningful
latitude in formulating water control schemes. When health
and safety concerns have been recognized as paramount,
substantial state interference with interstate commerce has
been permitted. 6 There is nothing to suggest that this would
not be the case with ground water regulation.
While the Sporhase Court established state claims to public
ownership of natural resources to be mere legal fictions, the
Court found, somewhat incongruously, that such claims were
not wholly irrelevant to commerce clause analysis. 63 The Court
noted that state claims to public ownership of ground water
were "logically more substantial than claims to public ownership of other natural resources" 64 and that in any event a
state's reliance on that theory was expressive of the importance of that resource to the people of the state. 65 Thus, when
balancing local interests against incidental burdens upon interstate commerce, the fact that state water law is founded
upon the legal fiction of state ownership may tend to support a
limited preference for state citizens in the utilization of water
resources. 66
The Sporhase Court also recognized Nebraska ground
water to possess "some indicia of a good publicly produced and
owned in which a state may favor its own citizens in times of
shortage. '6 7 Noting its holding in Reeves v. Stake,68 the Court
apparently likened a state's conservation efforts to a state's
actual production, ownership and participation in the
marketplace. States engaged in a systematic scheme of water
62. Bradley v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933) (regulation to insure highway safety not violative of commerce clause).

63. 102 S.Ct. at 3463.
64. Id. at 3464.

65. Id. at 3461.
66. Id. at 3464.
67. Id. at 3464-65.
68. 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (state as market participant in cement industry permitted to
discriminate against non-citizens).
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resource management directed toward the ultimate goal of
conservation may therefore be permitted to impose substantial
burdens on commerce without necessarily running afoul of the
commerce clause.
Clearly the Court's reliance on the commerce clause
analysis prescribed by Pike does not preclude the states from
instituting legislative programs which effect and, to some
degree, regulate interstate commerce. Any fear that Sporhase
somehow undercuts state authority to control ground water
overdraft or to rely on long-standing prior appropriation
decrees is unfounded. There is little doubt, however, that state
legislation which is perceived as facially discriminatory, will be
subject to the "strictest scrutiny." State water legislation
which falls short of actual discrimination would appear to
stand a reasonable chance of passing constitutional muster. 69
In fact, given the importance of the public's interest in ground
water conservation, it is plausible that the Sporhase Court
would have upheld the questioned Nebraska statute were it not
for the blatantly discriminatory aspect of the reciprocity provision. 70
C. CongressionalAuthorization of DiscriminatoryPower
The commerce clause expressly authorizes Congress to
enact laws which preserve and promote free trade among the
states.7 1 Additionally, the "dormant commerce clause" theory
holds that the commerce clause stands alone, without the support of any particular congressional legislation, as its own
limitation on the regulatory power of the states.7 2 Unless Congress divests itself of its power to regulate some specific arena
or article of commerce, any state legislation which infringes on
that particular facet of commerce runs the risk of intruding into the sphere of reserved federal powers. 3
69. Sporhase disregarded the aspect of the Pike test which questions the availability of nondiscriminatory alternatives, suggesting that the Court would be reluctant to engage in
this heightened level of scrutiny. Future adjudications involving the commerce clause implications of ground water exportation bans would tend toward upholding such restrictions if the states were required merely to substantiate narrowly tailored legislation
rather than to demonstrate the total non-existence of non-discriminatory alternatives.
70. The Court intimated that the discriminatory reciprocity provision may be severable. 102
S.Ct. at 3467. Furthermore, in Sporhase Justice Stevens indicated in dicta that overt
discrimination might be tolerated: "A demonstrably arid state conceivably might be able
to marshall evidence to establish a close means-end relationship between even a total ban
on the exportation of water and a purpose to conserve and preserve water." Id. at 3465.
71. U.S. CONST., art. 1, S 8, cl. 3.
72. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
73. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976).
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The Sporhase Court rejected the defense that the State of
Nebraska had been authorized to burden interstate commerce
in ground water and thus to trespass on this "dormant" range
of exclusive, though unexercised federal power. Neither the
failure of Congress to forge federal ground water legislation
nor Congress' willingness to let the states settle their differences through mutual agreement was found sufficient to
command the conclusion that it had consented to the states'
unilateral imposition of discriminatory legislation.7 4
The Sporhase Court instead relied in its recent holding in
New EnglandPower C. v. New Hampshire,7 5 finding that congressional intent to insulate state legislation from commerce
clause attacks could not be judicially inferred. To the contrary,
such congressional intent and policy must be "expressly
stated. ' 7 6 The courts have no authority to engage in mere
77
speculation as to what Congress had in mind.
Sporhase clearly endorsed the "consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress."178 The Court refused, however, to equate congressional
deference with congressional authorization of otherwise
discriminatory legislation. Thus, the Court indicated that the
states could continue to control ground water withdrawal and
usage at the local level only so long as those state regulations
were valid, i.e., so long as the state regulations did not unconstitutionally invade the provinces of reserved federal
powers. 9 On the other hand, the Sporhase Court emphasized
its duty to sustain state legislation whenever it found persuasive evidence that Congress had adhered to the dictates of
New England Power.80
III. THE IMPACT OF Sporhase ON
INTERSTATE WATER ALLOCATION

Not surprisingly the Sporhase decision raises at least as
many questions as it answers. Although the Court checked
74. 102 S.Ct. at 3466.
U.S. __, 102 S.Ct. 1096 (1982).
75. __
76. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3466 (1982).
77. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 102 S.Ct. at 1102-03 (1982).
78. 102 S.Ct. at 3466 n.19 (quoting California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978)).
79. 102 S.Ct. at 3466.
80. Id.
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state authority to govern interstate commerce in ground water
by tracing a line across which state legislatures must not
tread, the Court left some question as to exactly where that
line is drawn. One aspect of that question concerns to what extent, if any, Sporhase limited the scope of interstate water
allocation schemes.
The law acknowledges three primary techniques in
allocating waters between states-judicial equitable apportionment decrees, direct congressional allocation and interstate
compacts. Traditionally, these allocation techniques have addressed the problems of surface water allocation, yet there is
little to suggest that similar methods could not be employed to
resolve ground water controversies. 81 The Sporhase Court
observed that, over the years, judicial recognition of interstate
allocation had fostered the legal expectation that each state
could restrict water within its borders. In the same breath the
Court pointed to the "relevance of state boundaries in the
8' 2
allocation of scarce water resources.
The general framework of interstate allocation is relatively simple. In the absence of either a direct act of Congress or
an approved interstate compact, the Court has turned to the
doctrine of equitable apportionment when settling water
rights disputes between states.8 3 In entertaining such suits,
however, the Court has not regarded equitable apportionment
as a systematic method of analysis. "Equitable
apportionment" is merely a generalized term which encompasses the "federal interstate common law" as it may apply to
disputes over interstate water rights.84 As a species of the
common law, equitable apportionment is not codified by
statute; instead it considers "all the factors which create
equities in favor of one State or the other .... ,"85 The object
always is "to secure an equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas. ' 86 Thus, the Court is not concerned -that
81. Ground water use has occasionally been considered as a factor in interstate allocati6,
primarily as it relates to the depletion of surface flow. See, e.g., Upper Niobrara-River
Compact, WYo. STAT. S 41-12-701 (1977).
82. 102 S.Ct. at 3464.
83. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over suits between states regarding the division and use of interstate waters. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 80-84 (1906).
84. Id. at 98.
85. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 394 (1943).
86. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931).
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there be an equal division of water between the two states that
share a common water source, but simply that principles of
equity be applied in apportioning the benefits of the water
source.8 7
Unfortunately, one overriding consideration limits the
availability of a suit for equitable apportionment in a given
dispute. The Supreme Court has been extraordinarily hesitant
to invoke its original jurisdiction in this arena, preferring the
"grass roots" negotiation of interstate compacts to its own apportionment decrees. 8 This judicial reluctance to enter into interstate water controversies evolves from the realization that
such cases involve quasi-sovereigns, present delicate political
questions and by nature require expert administration rather
than judicial imposition of a hard and fast rule.8 9 As a result,
the Court has steadfastly refused to control the conduct of one
state at the petition of another unless it can be shown that the
threatened invasion of water rights is of a "serious
magnitude." 90 In practical effect, the Court's stance has
meant that equitable apportionment is an available remedy
only when the controverted waters are fully utilized in either
one or both of the party states and when that continued use is
substantially threatened. 91
An alternative and virtually untapped means of interstate
water allocation has been direct congressional allocation. In
Arizona v. California02-to date the only dispute involving
congressional allocation-the Court held that Congress has the
power to allocate interstate waters and that it had done so in
that case with the Boulder Canyon Project Act. Moreover, the
Court found that where Congress has provided its own method
87. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) In Nebraska, the Court implicitly
recognized that equity did not necessarily mean equality. The Court also noted that just
and equitable apportionment did not always allow or strict adherence to the rule of prior
appropriation even where both adverse parties were prior appropriation states. Id. at
618.
88. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3466, n.20; New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296,
313 (1921). In New York the Court suggested that an interstate dispute was "more likely
to be wisely solved by coiperative study and by conference and mutual concession on the
part of representatives of the States so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in any
court however constituted." 256 U.S. at 313.
89. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. at 392 (1943).

90. New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. at 309 (1921).
91. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 u.s. 589, 607-11 (1945); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423,
463-64 (1931).
92. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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for allocating interstate waters, courts have no power to
substitute their own notions of equitable apportionment for
those of Congress. 93 Sporhase, of course, indicated that the
Court would extend its earlier decision in Arizona to include
ground water legislation, holding that "[g]round water overand Congress has the power to deal
draft is a national problem
94
scale."
that
on
it
with
Some may argue that direct congressional allocation is the
definitive solution to water shortages in the arid states. Long
range and broad based planning appear essential to the
assurance of plentiful and uninterrupted water supplies.
Arguably, federal financial and legal assistance is imperative.
Nevertheless, some of the arguments favoring congressional
allocation also tend to weigh against it. Any benefits which
may flow from federal involvement in water allocation could be
discounted by the political unacceptability of federal interference.
The final and ultimately most satisfactory means of interstate allocation is the interstate compact. At its best the interstate compact embodies the advantages of direct congressional allocation without assuming the perceived disadvantages of taking on the federal government as an intimate and
potentially troublesome partner. The interstate compact has
been continually and expressly recommended by the Supreme
Court as a means of settlement preferable to litigation. Yet,
bound by the prohibitions of the Constitution,9" "a complaining
State can neither treat, agree, nor [sic] fight with its adversary, without the consent of Congress .... ,, 96 Typically, though
not always, negotiotion of an interstate compact takes place in
three stages: (1) an act of Congress authorizing negotiation; (2)
negotiation of the compact, often by a group including a
federal representative; and (3) approval by Congress. 97 Follow93. Id. at 565.
94. 102 S.Ct. at 3463.
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 10, cl. 3: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress... enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power ......
96. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 144 (1902) (quoting Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 726 (1838)).
97. WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 20, at S 133.2. The Supreme Court has held
that consent may come in the form of some action by Congress, which expressly or impliedly signifies consent. Congressional acquiescence in a compact is taken to be the
equivalent of congressional consent. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
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ing congressional approval the compact and any apportionment therein is binding upon the citizens of each signatory
state. 98 Thus, every interstate compact presents a federal
question in its construction; however, no interstate compact is
a statute of the United States.99
Aside from its political attractiveness, the single greatest
virtue of the interstate compact lies in its usefulness in terms
of long range planning.' 00 While equitable apportionment
necessarily involves the concept of "ripeness" or justiciability
requiring that present claims exceed the available water supply, interstate compact negotiations involve no similar restrictions. Thus, by agreement, interested states can effectively
make a present appropriation for future use. Given the high
stakes involved in the planning and financing of any large scale
water project, some device for assuring the continued
availability of water supplies is essential.
Whatever course is taken, the end result of any interstate
water allocation is that the total available water supply-the
"bundle of sticks"-is divided more or less equitably between
the states which share the source of that supply. Thus,
Sporhase inevitably raises the question of whether states may
prohibit the exportation of their respective shares of allocated
water without running afoul of the commerce clause.
The Sporhase Court lucidly observed that congressional
deference to state water law via the passage of certain federal
statutes and approval of interstate compacts did not indicate
that Congress intended to forfeit commerce clause constraints
on state water regulation in general. 10 The Court, however,
appreciated that Congress has deferred to particular valid
state laws through its various statutes and interstate compact
endorsements. 10 2 In the Court's view, the validity of a given
state law rests primarily on the challenged statute being
98. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106 (1938).
99. People v. Central R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 455, 456 (1870). See also WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 20, at S 133.3.
100. The vision of the interstate compact as a tool for long range regional planning was
espoused and influenced in a historic article co-authored by Felix Frankfurter, while he
was a Harvard Law Professor. Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in InterstateAdjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925).
101. 102 S.Ct. at 3466.
102. Id.
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established either as non-discriminatory or as exempted from
commerce clause attack by an express act of Congress. 103
Clearly, as evidenced by Sporhase, a state law seeking to
absolutely prohibit the issuance of water use permits to parties
intending to transport water beyond state boundaries cannot
pass the non-discrimination test. On the other hand, if the
source involved is subject to an interstate allocation it may be
argued that such discrimination has been congressionally
authorized. Armed with some means of interstate allocation,
the Western states may thus sweep an end run around
Sporhase under certain circumstances.
Borrowing language from its decisions in New England
0 4
Power Co. v. New Hampshire1
and PrudentialInsurance Co.

v. Benjamin,05 the Sporhase Court noted that congressional
intent to insulate state legislation from commerce clause attack must be "expressly stated."' 0 6 Though congressional approval of a given interstate compact does not authorize states
to impose unreasonable or discriminatory burdens on commerce at their caprice, it seems apparent that such an action is
an express removal of obstacles to state regulation in that
specific instance. It must be assumed that Congress, in its
enabling action, has thrown the whole weight of its power
behind the state-negotiated compact. 10 7 Otherwise, such congressional action would be rendered virtually meaningless.
Still, congressional delegation of authority to discriminate
against commerce may not be absolute even in the context of
valid interstate compacts. Authorization to discriminate as a
general proposition does not necessarily inform a state as to
against whom and under what particular circumstances it may
discriminate against the citizens of another state.
Resorting to the tried-and-true analogy of the entire water
supply as a "bundle of sticks," assume that Congress has approved a compact allocating one-half of the sticks to one state
103. Id.
104.
105.
106.
107.

102 S.Ct. at 1102.
328 U.S. 408, 427 (1946).
102 S.Ct. at 3466.
See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 430 (1946) (South Carolina expressly
authorized by Congress to impose otherwise impermissible burdens on foreign insurance
carriers).
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(Si) and one-half of the sticks to another (S2). Apparently Congress has then consented to Si's discrimination against S2 in
the event that S2 attempts to claim more than one-half the
sticks. S1 should then be able to deny a permit to S2 or anyone
who expresses an intent to import Si water into S2.
But suppose that neither state is fully utilizing its share of
the sticks. It seems clear under such circumstances that S2
should not be prohibited from "borrowing" a few sticks from
S1 so long as those sticks are "chargeable" to S2's allocation.
Should S1 attempt to thwart this plan by denying a water use
permit it seems that this would be an unconstitutional
discrimination even though both states are parties to a valid interstate compact. Carried to an extreme, it appears that
neither state could constitutionally prohibit the transfer of its
water so long as neither state "netted" more than its allocated
share of the sticks. Only in the event that one state attempted
to exceed its share should the other state be permitted to
discriminate against interstate commerce in water.
To take the concept a step further, assume that a third
state (SS), which is not a party to the compact, wishes to
withdraw water from S1 and transport it for use in 58. Assuming that S3 is otherwise rightfully entitled to appropriate a few
sticks from S1, whether through direct appropriation of unused waters or through the purchase of water rights on the open
market, it appears that any denial of such a permit would
result in a blatant discrimination against interstate commerce.
The discrimination authorized by Congress and allowed by
Sporhase must be narrowly construed to be specific as between
the compacting states and even then permitted only when one
compacting state seeks to exceed its allocated share. In the
absence of specific authorization, any discrimination against
S3 would fail the "evenhandedness" test of Pike.
Many of the same issues arise when the interstate allocation is by means of equitable apportionment or congressional
allocation. Of course, a situation involving interstate transfer
is less likely to occur in cases involving equitable apportionment, since the water concerned was presumably fully
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appropriated or used at the time of the decree. However, it is
entirely possible that a landowner in S2 could acquire the
water rights of a landowner in S1, intending to transfer the
water interstate, citing the transfer as a mere change in use.
Again, the question of "chargeability" surfaces. Additional
questions would undoubtedly arise should an individual's land
straddle the state border as was the case in the Sporhase
dispute. This would be particularly troublesome in a state
following the "reasonable use" doctrine, which essentially requires that water be used only on the overlying land. Should
the landowner's tract in S2 be considered as "on the land" for
purposes of S1 water law? Should the use of Si's water on the
S2 tract be charged to S1 or S2?
The possible permutations are considerable and well
beyond the scope of this note. Much would depend on the particular state water law in question and on the specific provisions of any compact or other form of interstate allocation. Let
it suffice to say that Sporhase was hardly the death knell to the
practice of water law in the Western states.
IV. CONCLUSION

At first blush the Sporhase decision may appear to cripple
the states in their efforts to preserve and conserve scarce
water resources. The Court's definitive characterization of
ground water as an article of commerce clearly limits the
states' power to regulate in this critical area, and at the same
time, opens the floodgates to ground water regulation by
Congress.
A closer look, however, reveals that state power to
regulate ground water has not been severely curtailed. In fact,
the Sporhase Court recognized that the states should be afforded considerable latitude when drafting ground water legislation. As long as the states either refrain from implementing
overtly discriminatory legislation or are granted congressional
authorization to do so, the Court indicated that it would continue to place substantial weight on state conservation
interests.
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The day may well arrive when the arid Western states
become net water importers in their battle to insure plentiful
water supplies. From this perspective, the Court's emphasis on
state interests and non-discriminatory legislation, as evidenced in Sporhase, is a victory for those Western states.
JOSEPH KELLY
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